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Historically the concept of Ideology belongs to the
recent past. The concept of Ideology is central to all
genuine criticism of culture and society and is for this
reason intimately associated with the Idea of Freedom. In
the first part of this article I have attempted an analysis
of the historical movement of the concept of Ideology in
order to salvage its critical function from the danger of
its neutralization by the sociology of knowledge. In the
second part, the fate of this concept and its relation to
the crisis of Marxism will be examined.
Ideology has ceased to be ideology in the proper sense; only that· which exists,
reality, is ideological. This apparent paradox is the thesis of the last chapter
of the recently translated book Aspects of Sociology by the Frankfurt Institute
of Social Research. It was already revealed by Theodor Adorno in his essay
Kulturkritik und Gessellschaft ("The criticism of culture and society") written
in 1949 and which later served as the first chapter of his collection of essays
published in book form in 1955 under the title of Prismen: Kulturkritik und
Gesellschaft. The book Sociologica II by Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer
which appeared in German in 1962, also contains an elaboration of this thesis.
In general, I would say that this thesis is at the basis of most of the
contemporary criticism of advanced capitalist reality. The "absorption of
ideology into reality," as Marcuse, one of the most outstanding propounders of
this thesis would say, is simply revealed by a situation in which "individuals
identify themselves with the existence which is imposed upon them and have in
it their own development and satisfaction! This identification is not illusion
but rea1ity ..•There is only one dimension, and it is everywhere and in all forms"
(Marcuse, 1966:11).
To comprehend why this thesis is being proposed today it is necessary to
review not only the concept of ideology in its historical movement but the present
crisis of Marxism as well. The insight that reality has become its own ideology
does in fact reflect the crisis of Marxism. The desperate attempts to combine
existentialism and the phenomenology of Husserl with Marxism, as well as the
attempts by the Frankfurt School to go back, according to its critics, to the
criticism of the Neo-Hegelians, indicates both the sense of impotency of
critical Marxism and its connection to the conception of reality as its own
ideology. The crisis of Marxism was already evident in 1923 when Karl Korsh
published his Marxismus und Philosophy and when Georg Lukacs published his
History and Class Consciousness. It may even be possible to say that the redis-
covery or anticipation of the early Marx by these two authors was of no conse-
quence, except to bring to the surface the crisis of Marxism. The emphasis on
the critical side of Marx rather than the more "positivistic" or "scientific"
side, was already intimately connected with the sense of loss of a revolutionary
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subject or agency to change the oppressive and exploitative conditions of
domination. Marxism since 1890 had shown its inability to bring about this change,
and since Karsh this was attributed to the neglect of its critical side and the
emphasis on the "latent positivism" of the later Marx. Marxism was even held
to have degenerated into different ideologies ranging from "mechanism,"
"economicism," to an extreme "subject voluntarism."
The transformation of Marx's theory into a completely deterministic theory
objective materialism similar to that of the natural sciences facilitated this
degeneration. The positivistic interpretation of Marx had shown itself to be more
useful to the development of bourgeois capitalism than in overcoming it. Korsh
and Lukacs were among the first to become aware of this fate of Marxism and to
realize that the revolutionary consciousness had been repressed and forgotten.
This was attributed to the fact that the origins of Marx in the idealist
philosophy of Hegel had been strained. The mechanistic materialism of the
Second International with its elimination of man as a subject had a great deal to
do with the return of Karsh and Lukacs to Hegel and their stress on the critique
of alienation. The changed conditions of capitalism in the industrially advanced
countries appeared to reveal two things clearly: reality itself had become its
own ideology, and the proletariat was lost as a revolutionary subject. The
conception of reality as ideology cannot, then, be separated from the sense of
loss of a revolutionary subject. The concept of ideology in Marx was inseparable
from the criticism of ideology, that is, it must implicitly or explicitly
address itself critically to the question of the possibility of changing society.
From the beginning the goal was to end reification and alienation. But
two problems are involved here, and both relate to the conception of what is
the active agent in society that could being about the end of reification. At
one extreme we have the objective necessity of reification and the dialectic of
immediacy and mediation are assumed to realize the end of reification. Criticism
of reification by itself, according to the opponents of the objective necessity
of reification, is contemplative, that is, it leaves the question as to how and
who is to realize dereification problematic. It is held to ultimately end in
either an extreme subjective voluntarism or an objective determinism. At the other
extreme we have the subjective possibility: reification is not accepted as
necessary, although it is acknowledged to be present, and the problem comes to
be one of finding or creating a subject which by becoming the "subject-object
identical" would end reification. This possibility, it is entertained, ultimately
ends up in an objective voluntarism or in a subjective determinism. The present
so~called crisis of Marxism is faced precisely with the problem of a clearly
sensed absence of an active agent, hence the conception that reality has become
its own ideology. It has appeared, to Marxists and bourgeois analysts alike,
that the conditions of advanced industrial societies have precluded the working
classes from attaining a revolutionary class-consciousness. The fate of the
New Left is only the most recent evidence.
One cannot find more charges of being ideological than among Marxists them-
selves. Given the crisis of Marxism, the criticism of ideology has not only come
to occupy a central position, but it has turned the process int a kind of
paranoia; it is not strongly suspected that a critique of ideology can itself
turn into ideology. "The concept of ideology is today ideology. The same is
in store for reification. . •• Reification has become a pass word for
reification; under the brand of authenticity, more of the same is retailed.
No critical concept is immune to depletion." (See Review of Adorno's Aufsatze
zur Gesellschaftstheorie und Methodologie by Jacoby, 1970:343). It is for this
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reason that Marxism and its conception of ideology hopes that it can remain
critically effective only if Marxism develops critically or if it is constantly
updated. One type of updating is the shift within Marxism from a concern with
revolution to the concern with the critique of everyday life, to the return to
intersubjectivity, to Heidegger's "Being-in-the-world." This self-critical
Marxist renaissance, furthermore, emphatically demands "demystification" of
Marxism by critical reexamination. The various brands of this neo-Marxism,
which all meet the official disapproval of Soviet Marxism, range from the
Humanism of the anti-bureaucratic Eastern European Marxists, the "Critical Theory"
of the Frankfort School, the existentialist Marxism of Sartre and Merleau-Ponty,
the Freudian Marxism of Marcuse and Fromm, and the phenomenological Marxism (which
has flourished since the appearance of Russerl's Crisis of the European Sciences)
of Paul Piccone and Enzo Paci, to name only a few. What all these brands of
Marxism have in common is their concern with the criticism of the ideology of
advanced capitalism which includes heavy doses of criticism of science and
technology. They all emphasize the early Marx and either criticize the late
Marx, or attempt to show his continuity. In addition, they all seem to agree
on the sense of loss of a revolutionary agent, although some among them have tried
to single out the university student as a potential revolutionary. In fact, the
more philosophically oriented neo-Marxists regard the discussion of the revolu-
tionary character of the workers as the cornerstone of dogmatic Marxism which
they reject. They, instead, prefer to examine the critical tenets of Marx's
own Marxism. Finally, most of these varieties of neo-Marxism assume that reality
has become its own ideology and that the criticism of ideology is synonymous with
the criticism of everyday life and distorted everyday communication. The level
that criticism of ideology achieved and the acute penetration into the capitalist
society has nevertheless brought intellectuals to a stronger awareness of their
ambiguous role in the revolutionary movement. Their concern with the explanation
of why the revolutionary consciousness has failed to emerge is part of this
feeling of ambiguity.
The concept of ideology in Marx was ultimately connected to the possibility
of a revolution that would throw out the fetters of capitalism. In fact, a
concept of ideology which does not lead to a criticism useful for revolutionary
emancipation is itself acritical; it fails to realize the oft-repeated phase of
Marxism--the unity of theory and praxis. Ultimately, the criticism of ideology,
if it is not to remain an academic pasttime, must aid revolutionary praxis.
Since the concept of ideology is so crucial, for on this concept depends
effective criticism, I am obliged to review its historical development before we
can begin to examine the crisis of Marxism. I will attempt such a review in this
article, leaving the latter point for the second part. There I will come back
to the problem presented by reality as its own ideology, and also to the
possibility that Marxism, in spite of its opposition to the so-called bourgeois
thought, may represent an avant-guard Enlightenment, an advanced bourgeois ideology
as an historical force which could serve the development of capitalism up to the
exhaustion of all its possibilities.
The word "ideology," like many other expressions, has achieved universal
acceptance today in common parlance and therefore, although not because of this,
it has lost most of the theoretical and critical significance that it could have
enjoyed. Ideology is frequently understood as a particular point of view, a
theory, an intellectual position, a particular intellectual inclination, or, as
in the case of Mannheim, a formal and abstract totality of thought "total
ideologies"). Groups, political parties, and factions of the most diversified
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characters have employed this word to refer to their so-called principles or
"philosophies." The subsumption of such multifarious thoughts under the concept
of ideology is more an expression of an impotent relativism than a penetration
and clarification of this concept in its historical movement; the criticism of
ideology must then necessarily resolve into the same impotency.
Underlying the commonly accepted concept of ideology is the conception
that the intellectual products of man, although incorporated into the social
processes, have an independent existence which is subject to criticism. Their
independence together with the conditions by which they gain their independence
are conceived under the name of "ideology." This independence itself and the
constitution of a class that takes up the sphere of the spirit as its own dis-
tinctive domain of activity is conceived to be the result of the division of
labor. The eternal world of ideas is the privilege of those exempt from manual
labor. These spiritual products then allegedly serve particular interests (The
Frankfurt Institute, 1972:182). Such is more or less the accepted condition
of "ideology" which thinks it has brought its concept, and the sociology that
deals with it, into opposition with the traditional philosophy of external
essences (Frankfurt Institute, 1972:182). The use of the word "ideology" in such
an amorphous and apparently universal sense has, in fact, obscured and obliterated
the possibility of criticism. The critical element that it contains, and which
opposes the pretentious intellect that considers itself unconditioned, remains
hidden in the past.
The historical movement of thought culminating in this cloudy concept of
ideology conceals the fact that ideology had once exerted itself critically,
but that it has also surrendered to the opposite. For example, when at the
end of the eighteenth century the opposition to the absolutism of the French
government articulated by the thought of the Enlightenment lost its political
function, it became clear that the speculative thought of the Enlightenment was
diminished with the results of the bourgeois revolution. It finally came to
incorporate the sensualism imported from England and resulted in the positivism
which has prevailed up to this time. The initial insight into the content of
false consciousness and its criticism put forward by the Enlightenment was not
developed but, in fact, sabotaged by this positivism. The development of the
concept of ideology and past attempts to criticize ideology need to be exposed
if we want to understand not only the commonly accepted conception held today,
but the delusions that it entails as well. Such delusions may, needless to say,
be concealed with the amorphous use of the concept of ideology itself. The
reasons for such exposition seem then to need little justification. If the
concept of ideology is mistaken, or if such a concept is pre-empted of all
content, then the criticism of ideology may itself be ideological. This is in
fact the case in the sociology of knowledge which in dealing with ideology as
its subject matter has its~lf become ideology. Furthermore, the possibility
mentioned earlier in connection with the crisis of Marxism that every critical
concept may De surreptitiously neutralized is a danger which deserves careful
examination. One must do justice to the historical movement of the concept of
ideology even if only in a sketchy manner.
In the early Enlightenment, Bacon already pointed to the collective pre-
judices which oppressed mankind. He called these prejudices "Idols": for
example, the idols of the market and mass society. He furthermore noticed that
the ill and unfit choice of words distorts communication and understanding and
throw all into confusion. Bacon's concept of ideology, contained in his doctrine
of the idols, "sought to further the emancipation of the emerging bourgeois con-
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sciousness from the tutelage of the Church and, in this ... progressive
character... the limitations of ... bourgeois consciousness are already dis-
cernable .•. " (Frankfurt Institute, 1972:184). The abstract subjectivism of
Baconian philosophy is inseparable from its materialism. The latter, with Bacon
and later with Hobbes, put forward the idea that the senses are infallible and
are the source of all knowledge. As a consequence, Baconian philosophy attributed
men's delusions, men's false consciousness to an inherent property of human
beings, that is, to human nature as a law of Nature. Materialism in this sense
is hostile to thought itself, especially since within its conception all
critical thought could be dismissed as "ideological" when it does not comply with
sense-based knowledge and materialist "reason." If man's senses are the source of
all knowledge, then thought which contradicts and criticizes the given is nothing
but the false ghost of the material world which must be eradicated by the adequate
knowledge of the laws of Nature. The conditions which make men what they are
are ignored and their delusions in the end are justified. This abstract subjecti-
vism, which in modified form will reappear in the Ideologues, is, ironically, still
contained within the commonly accepted concept of ideology today. For example,
Geiger in his Ideologie und Wahrheit attributes false consciousness or ideology
to "name giving," to "logical impurities," to the "subjects' fallibility," to a
"mentality" unrelated to the social structure, et cetera. As a result, the study
of ideology is reduced to the "classification of ideologies." According to
Geiger; "Till now such a systematically comprehensive investigation has not been
undertaken. . • It would require the collection and analysis of many hundreds,
perhaps thousands of statements suspected of ideology" (Geiger, 1953:quoted in
Frankfurt Institute, 1972:203). False consciousness is forever justified. This
is the result of the subjectivistic abstractions of positivism and of its allied
relativism. Geiger's positivism accepts only the historically handed-down idea
of false consciousness in the abstract but cannot penetrate it. The concept of
ideology remains at the Baconian level. The critical functions that can be
derived from such a conception of ideology can only be applied to an age such as
Bacon's, if it even goes ·that far.
A further and decisive step in the historical movement of the concept of
ideology as sketched by Bacon is already discernible in the Enlightenment with
the English Hobbes, the Italian Giambattista Vico, the left-wing French
encyclopedists such as Vol.taire, Diderot, and Helvetius, and finally Halbach.
Such a decisive step crystallized later only in connection with the social
movements of the nineteenth century and became the core of Marx's theory of
historical materialism.
For the encyclopedists Helvetius and Holbach, prejudices serve the main-
tenance of unjust and inhuman conditions. They oppose "the realization of
happiness and the establishment of a rational society" (Frankfurt Institute, 1972:
185). For Helvetius "all questions of morals and politics are decided by force
and not by reason. If opinion rules the world, then, in the long run, it is
the powerful who rule opinion" (Helvetius, De ;'Homme, quoted in Frankfurt
Institute, 1972:185). Halbach similarly says that "Authority generally
considers it in its interest to maintain received opinions: the prejudices and
errors which it considers necessary for the secure maintenance of its power are
perpetuated by this power, which never reasons" (Paul Heinrich von Ho1bach,
Systeme de la nature on des lois du monde physique et du monde moral, quoted in
Frankfurt Institute, 1972:185). And Helvetius again, "Our ideas are the necessary
.::::3cquence of the society in which we live" (Helvetius, 'De 1 'Esprit, quoted in
Fra~kiurt Institute, 1972:185). Although there is a trace here of Marx's famous
statement that the ideas of an age are the ideas of its ruling class, we must
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not forget that the encyclopedists' conception of ideology as prejudices tends to
reduce false consciousness to the mere machinations of the rulers and does not
penetrate into the objective roots of ideology. The clarification of this point
must be postponed. What I want to stress, though, is important. The French
Enlightenment of the eighteenth century opposed not only the existing political
institutions, religion and theology, but the metaphysics of the seventeenth
century (Descartes, Leibnitz, and Spinoza) which supported these institutions
and rationalized theology. Their concept of ideology was critical and without
it we cannot proceed to understand what would be a critical concept of ideology
today. Yet, what actually is ideology today cannot be understood by simply
incorporating an already changed concept of ideology and by disregarding its
historical realization. Thus, those who hold fast to, a concept of ideology such
as that of the encyclopedists, who no doubt conceived it critically, regress to the
affirmation of social conditions which long ago have relegated such a conception
to the realm of acritical conformism and passive acquiescence. Instead of letting
the criticism of the past serve as the sanctification of the present, we must see
how the criticism of the past has materialized in the ideology of the present.
The most radical expression of the Enlightenment, besides Helvetius, is found
in Denis Diderot, the editor of the Encyclopedie ou Dictionnaire Raisonne des
Sciences, des Arts, et des Metiers. In the essay which Diderot wrote to define
the word encyclopedie, and which appeared in Volume V (1755), we have a clear
indication of the conception of ideology that had to be criticized and overcome.
In essence, it was nothing more than the prevalent views that justified the feudal
order. Three major aspects of this ideology had to be confronted: the yoke of
authority had to be shaken off, the common prejudices had to be critically exposed,
and the traditional secrecy of the crafts had to be ended by divulgation. The
laws of reason and of nature were to be counterposed to the prevalent ideology.
"The progress of reason," Diderot wrote, ''will overthrow so many idols."
Everything which was not "founded 'upon the truths of nature" was to be indicted
for it did not promote the realization of freedom and virtue. (See: Diderot,
1964:287). The Encyclopedie would have "the power to change men's connnon way of
thinking. . . , to throw down the whole edifice of mud and scatter the idle heap
of dust" (Diderot, 1964:296). The reeducation of men was indispensable and
necessary; it had to be carried out mercilessly and to the disregard of anyone's
sensibilities. Diderot powerfully emphasized that "all things must be examined,
all must be winnowed and sifted without exception and without sparing anyone's
sensibilities" (Diderot, 1964:297). Furthermore, "we must trample mercilessly
upon .•. ancient puerilities, [and] overturn the barriers that reason never
erected•.• " (Diderot, 1964:298).
A "revolution • • . in the minds of men and in the national character"
(Diderot, 1964:287) was then necessary to emancipate man from the idols that
enslaved his mind, and lack of knowledge was assumed to sustain the conditions
preventing man from the achievement of progress and happiness. The Encyclopedie,
for this reason, had to consciously aim at the general education of all men--
the word encyclopedie was chosen from the Greek enkyklios-circular, total; and
paideia-education, ins~ruction, knowledge--through the divulgation of the practical
knowledge of the various arts and crafts developed by man. Since that knowledge
lS still confined within the respective trades, its divulgation would not only
end that secrecy, but in doing so, would release the great potentialities for
progress. It is well known now how this divulgation paved the way for the
industrial revolution and the rising of the bourgeoisie.
The divulgation of the crafts had an extremely critical significancelfor.it
meant bringing the real active, working, creative man to the center ot aL th1ngs.
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Diderot wrote:
. . • if one banishes from the face of the earth the thinking and
contemplating entitYt man~ then the sublime and moving spectacle of
nature will be but a sad and silent scene; the universe will be
hushed; darkness and silence will regain their way. . • It is
only the presence of men that makes the existence of other beings
significant. What better plan [for the Encyclopedie], then, in
writing the history of these beings, than to subordinate oneself
to this consideration? .• Why should we not make him [man] the
center of all that is? •.. With man at the center, how lively and
pleasing will be the ensuing relations between man and other
beings, between other beings and man: ... For man is the unique
starting point, and the end to which everything must finally be
related if one wishes to please, to instruct, to move to sympathy.
(Diderot, 1964:292-293).
And he continues:
Why should we be so concerned to preserve the history of men's thoughts
to the neglect to the history of their good deeds [arts, crafts, work]?
Is not the latter history the more useful? Is it not the latter that
does the most honor to the human race? (1964:300).
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This remarkable statement forecasts the anthropocentric view which Marx was to
use as the basis of his criticism of bourgeois ideology. But for Diderot it
summarized the criticism of feudal society. The freedom and progress of man
require that man be brought to the realization that he is the center of all
things, "for man is the unique starting point, and the end to which everything
must finally be related." Diderot's criticism was then explicitly based on a
concept of ideology whic~ essentially saw man in a state of religious alienation
that supported the feudal order. Once this concept was made operative it
necessarily pointed at the primacy of material history over the "history of men's
thoughts" in order to understand man and to achieve that "revolution in the minds
of men" which Diderot so vehemently hoped for as the would-be contribution of the
Encyclopedie. .
It is also important to mention briefly that one of Diderot's most
brilliant criticisms of morality, religion, government, the family, law,
property, and imperialism is found in his Supplement to Bougainvill~'s Vogage.
(See-Diderot,1964:179-228). The criticism of civilization which Diderot conveyed
in the Supplement brought to the surface the contradictions between an artificially
contrived ascetic morality on the one hand and a disgusting license on the other.
The contention that the non-contradictory life of "natural man" was lost in
civilization was later taken over by his one-time friend Rousseau.
The opposition that Diderot encountered as well as the enemies of the
Encyc10pedie faded away after the French Revolution of 1789. Their ideas had
established the most important philosophical basis as well as the principles of
equality and dignity of all men, which were the departure of the only true
revolution--the bourgeois revolution of 1789. The criticism of ideology carried
out by the Enlightenment materialized in a revolution because it already had a
struggling subject or agency--the emerging bourgeoisie. After that, the criticism
developed by the Enlightenment not only met little, if any, opposition, but it
became the literary pasttime of the upper and middle bourgeois sectors of French
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and European Society.1 The criticism of ideology lost its political function; it
exerted itself critically but surrendered to the opposite by incorporating the
sensualistic empiricism imported from England.
It is evident that today we would be inclined to say that the Enlighten-
ment, despite its merciless criticism of the dying absolutist order, did not
contain as yet a criticism of the emerging bourgeois order that it served. The
concept of ideology held by the Enlightenment did not and could not penetrate the
basis of reification, as objectively necessary false consciousness, which was to
appear as the ideology of the economic basis of developed capitalism. It never-
theless allowed criticism of the prejudices, idols, and lack of knowledge which
assumed1y prevented the realization of progress, freedom, equality and justice
among men as well as the establishment of reason. It critically exposed the
secrecy of the trades and the contradictions of an official morality which
co-existed with an opposite licentious behavior, a contradiction believed to be
lacking in the "natural state" of man. It was also critical of the theological
justification of temporal authority. And this is why their concept of ideology
was both critical and useful in dethroning the absolutistic feudal order; the
emerging bourgeoisie found in it both a perfect justification for their real
interests which the philosophy of the state transformed later into the interests
of all. The idea of reason further served to justify the state, the idea of the
self-destiny of man was embodied in a democratic idea of self-governance, and the
idea that knowledge of the laws of nature would end man's 'mystifications about
nature and themselves paved the way for the development of science and technology.
The education of all men was a requisite for the eradication of false conscious-
ness. Thus, although their criticism regarded ideology as an epiphenomena not
grounded in objective conditions--such a conception did not arise until the advent
of the market economy of developed capitalism--the criticism of authority,
property, law, religion and the family, even if it appealed idealistically for a
reform of consciousness, was effective, that is, it aided praxis because it had
an already struggling subject--the emerging bourgeoisie.
After the French Revolution and with the stabilization of the new bourgeois
order, the genuine criticism which the concept of ideology in the Enlightenment
contained faded away; or, if we prefer, it was realized in the new order. In a
diabolical reversal, the criticism of ideology became the new ideology. It was
left to Hegel and Marx to understand this phenomena as we will see below.
Meanwhile, and surprisingly enough, the study of ideology as conceived by
the sociology of knowledge today, and which in fact claims Marx as its originator,
was begun. Even the word "ideology" was coined. This took place in France when
L'Association des Ideologues undertook the task of investigating the independence
of ideas among themselves and the physiologic processes of the human body. The
word "ideology" was in fact coined by one of the chief exponents of L'Association,
Destutt de Tracy. The main concern of the ideologues was to study the content of
consciousness as mental phenomena. Their aim was "to prevent false abstract
principles from establishing themselves .•. because they hindered not only
communication between human beings but also the proper construction of the state
and of society" (Frankfurt Institute, 1972:186). False consciousness was neither
to be refuted nor to be denounced; only "the laws governing all sort of conscious-
ness, whether false or correct, are to be established" (Frankfurt Institute, 1972:
186). This was to be accomplished by a science in the image of physics:
intellectual life was to be explained as the mechanism of representations. A
natural science of the spirit was to "end once and for all the arbitrary and
optional character of opinions .•• ; false consciousness, that which later is
called ideology, is to dissolve when confronted by scientific method" (Frankfurt
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Institute, 1972:186). From then on the word "ideology" was to mean spirit or
intellect which depends on grossly material processes. It was not until Marx's
criticism of the French mechanistic materialism that the concept of ideology of
the ideologues was uncovered as acritical. 2 As I have already indicated,
mechanistic materialism lends itself adequately to the dismissal of all
critical thought as the false ghost of the material world. The relation of
this to the similar mechanistic interpretation of Marx by the official Marxism
of the Soviets need not be discussed here.
The emphasis on the analysis of consciousness and ideology, as held by
the Ideologues, had its political effects; and the criticism that derived from it,
if we can call it criticism, had a progressive purpose in consonance with the
emancipatory interests of the bourgeoisie. To be more precise, this criticism
had the political purpose of eradicating any "prejudice" which was not in
consonance with the march of the bourgeoisie and their order. The idea that
reason was to rule the world was coupled with the conception that knowledge of
the formation of thought from the standpoint of the natural scientific method
could provide legislators and statesmen with the tools to implant reason and
therefore to preserve the order desired by them. The natural scientific outlook
came then to define what ideology was. Anything that was not scientific was
arbitrary opinion which had to be both studied by science and eradicated by it.
False consciousness, rooted in grossly material and individual psyiological
processes, was to dissolve once it had been analyzed by the natural scientific
method. The impartiality of science and the dismissal of any critical thought
as "unscientific" dates back precisely to the achievements of the ideologues.
It is interesting to note that included in what was considered as ideology was
precisely that thought which was critical of the new ideology.
Natural science since its inception with Galileo was critical and, in a
sense, contributed towards a definition of false consciousness of the time.
The demythologization and deanthropomorphization of nature which science carried
out served as the criticism of an approach to Nature dominated by theology.
The conflict between science and theology was not so much due to a repudiation of
theology by science, but to the interest of the latter to divest itself of the
former's domination of the sphere of nature. Ever since the idea of the
superiority of science, corroborated by its success in the domination of nature,
has given it not only the ability to criticize anything which would interfere
with the development of capitalism, but the self-assurance of being the knowledge
by which man could finally establish reason in the world. The extension of the
natural scientific method to the sphere of man in society has led to the
unquestionable and universal conviction that science is to save man. Today, the
same arguments advanced by the Ideologues have reappeared in a more sophisticated
manner, no doubt with all the good intentions and the sincere critical spirit of
their propounders. The efforts to scientize man are inevitably connected with the
increasing rationalization of life; to the domination of man by man these efforts
represent the extension of that "instrumental reason," as Horkheimer called it in
his Critique of Instrumental Reason, which has served man in his mastery of Nature.
The natural scientific method contains a manipulative moment which it cannot and
does not want to extricate. The power of science does not reside in its method;
on the contrary, it resides in the men who can use it. The inherent manipulative
moment of science represents its own indictment. "The traditional idea of science
which once helped philosophy to free itself from the fetters of theology has
itself meanwhile become a fetter which forbids thought to think" (Adorno, 1970:
51-52). The criticism of science, and especially the attempt to extend the
natural scientific method to the study of man, was only possible with the advent
of the concept of reification and the concept of ideology which is applicable to
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today's conditions. I must therefore postpone its discussion till Part II. For the
moment, my purpose is again to illustrate how what was once critical can serve
now to reassert the very conditions that sustain it; yet) this intellect thinks
itself to be independent: With the ideologues, the study of "ideology" turned
itself into ideology; the concept of ideology was neutralized and totally deprived
of its critical content.
A more recent example of this phenomenon is provided by the sociology of
Vilfredo Pareto. According to Pareto, human action derives from the so-called
"residues" or innate inclinations which are irrational in the sense that they
are not necessarily beneficial for the individual or society. But man finds means
to justify to himself and to others the motives behind his actions. This he
accomplishes through the so-called "derivations," that is, logical reasons,
appeal to authority, or general principles. Pareto's concept of "derivations"
is close to the psychoanalytic concept of rationalization. The motives of man
are then fundamentally irrational and the explanation of their action must be
sought behind the derivatives. For Pareto, then, all is ideology. The ultra-
relativism behind this conception of ideology is, of course, consonant with the
denial by positivism of knowing the content of false consciousness. Thus, the
subjectivism of Pareto, which readily lends itself to social relativism, allows
him to derive the falsity of ideologies from the proposition "that men seek to
give a rational foundation and a justification for their true motives after. the
fact" (Frankfurt Institute, 1972:194) ..The study of ideology reduces then to
the abstract examination, by the logical experimental method of the derivatives
(or rationalizations) behind man's actions. Since, according to this conception
of ideology, truth--if it exists at all--is purely relative, only power is to
decide. The adequacy of this concept of ideology for the totalitarian state is
no longer a secret, as attested by Pareto's affinity to Mussolini's fascism.
Only this concept of ideology can allow power the claim to be the defender of the
eternal values of national destiny. Any critical thought which conflicts with
this destiny is debased to the level of an opinion or a rationalization of interest.
It is no coincidence that a similar conception of ideology prevails in the atmos-
phere of political liberalism with its concept of freedom of opinion.
So much talk and concern with the study of ideology has deprived the concept
of ideology of its critical content. The modern sociology of Knowledge, for
example, has taken ideology as its object of study and thereby ceases to be
critical. Accepting the idea of the ambiguous conditioning of consciousness by
existence, the sociology of knowledge has taken the task of describing the
spiritual inclination and the world of ideas of a given social stratum and
grounding them in a static typology. For example, Max Sheler, disregarding all
history, has sought to enumerate the most general types of consciousness and their
strict dependence on class position. According to him, the contemplation of
becoming is rooted in the lower class; that of being, in the upper class; the
mechanistic conception of the world has its basis in the upper class. Realism,
that is, the conception of the world as resistant, is found in the lower class;
the upper class inclines towards idealism or the world as the realm of ideas.
Materialism is attributed to the lower class while spiritualism belongs with
the upper class. Induction and empiricism is the inclination of the lower class
in contrast to rationalism and a priori knowledge which finds its foothold in the
upper class. The optimistic view of the future and the pessimistic judgment of
the past are modes of thinking of the lower class, where by contrast, the upper
class woulci assume a pessimistic look to the future in conjunction with a
romantic, optimistic retrospective look at the image of the "good old times."
Scheler furthermore insists that these points of view are not theories but that
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they are unconscious inclinations conditioned by class. They are also more than
mere prejudices; they are formal, inevitable laws of the formation of judgments
deeply rooted in class status, independent of individuality, race, or nationality.
Scheler wanted thereby to construct a systematic sociological theory of the idols
(Scheler, 1926; taken from Adorno and Horkheimer, 1971:60).
The concept of ideology in Pareto was intimately bound to a relativistic
position which did not exclude the absolutist doctrine of values. The sociology
of knowledge, on the other hand, is the other face of the relativist outlook that
now attempts to proclaim the conditioning of the spirit as an eternal philo-
sophical principle. Both concep.tions share the disregard of any historical
consciousness. The criticism of existing conditions is therefore obliterated
by this conception of ideology for such criticism would appear as an arbitrary
imposition of metaphysical constructs. If praxis needs to be justified by
immutable and necessary essences, but at the same time the historical conditioning
of consciousness represents a denial of this philosophical necessity, then this
contradiction itself represents the impotency of the concept of ideology to be
critical of anything.
The criticism engendered by the Enlightenment's concept of ideology was
identical with a theory of revolution. Utopia, the free creation of tomorrow's
truth, although stimulated by the immediately present existing conditions of
humanity and by man's created need to transcend these conditions, is not
ultimately deducible from the latter. It represents an independence of conscious-
ness which is more than a mere mark or impression of that which exists. With
the Enlightenment, these utopian independent consciousnesses put forward the
ideas of freedom, equality, justice, humanity, progress, and reason. Whether
these represented the self-deceptive false consciousness of the dying feudal
nobility which became self-destructive as Solomon claims, is not as important as
the fact that it served, in the hands of the emerging bourgeoisie, to repudiate
that order which the feudal nobility sought to justify.3
The repudiation of the feudal absolutist order by the bourgeois revolution
materialized in the liberal capitalis~ order. The triumphant bourgeoisie came
to regard their immediate class interests, their aspirations and their advancement
as synonymous with the interests of all. Capital, the transcendental God of the
bourgeois, was the principle of democracy that broke the bonds of superstition
of the Church. Industrial property, increase in wealth and prosperity was to give
power to the people; it was also the condition of freedom. Liberty was the abolition
of monarchy and the nobility; the abolition of feudal landed property was the
prerequisite for equality. In this new order the utopian ideas of freedom,
equality, justice, and reason came to be conceived of as already realized. The free
exchange of the market economy sustained this conception in the new capitalist
reality. The freedom of contract, or the equal opportunity for wage labor and
capital to exchange equivalents, sustained the belief of freedom and equality.
The legal order was shaped under the banner of "equality of all before the law" as
the realization of equality and justice. The state was finally the embodiment of
reason (Rousseau) and was to defend the interest~ of all for all. What was actual
was rational. What had been put forward by the Enlightenment as the criticism of
ideology materialized into the self-comprehending ideological legitimation of
capitalism. This dialectical negation came, then, to be sustained by the very
reality of the capitalist functioning; it was itself part of and functioned as the
comprehension of this reality. It became the false consciousness par excellence
that obscured and concealed the possibilities for the realization of the utopian
elements that it itself contained. It was an objectively necessary and yet false
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consciousness which masked the consciousness of a "real" exploitation and
alienation, thereby obliterating the possibility of ending them.
Ideology, then, is ideology only when it is thought that claims to be
independent of its social foundation but is all the while dependent; it is
thought which is not conscious of its dependence. This dependency has to be
interpreted carefully; it refers to nothing more, again, than that thought is
shaped as if the ideas of freedom, humanity and justice were already realized
in the conditions of human existence as immediately given, and is consequently
tied to this immediacy without attempting to go beyond it. This thought is
consequently as much determined by, as it in turn determines, the immediate
conditions; yet this thought thinks itself dependent. The so often called untruth
of ideology refers precisely to the fact that ideological thought either denies
this mutual determination or it is unconscious of it; it is a false conscious-
ness tied to the appearances of capitalist reality. The submissive certitude of
this consciousness manifests itself in a conformistic realism which when wanting
to be critical does not and cannot go beyond skeptical fatalism. Freedom is
reduced to the bare minimum of freedom to express opinions and the advocacy of
controversy. For this consciousness, the serious attempt to go beyond the
immediacy in which it is involved is regarded as another expression of the game
of controversy. The success of this false consciousness that thinks itself to
be critical is an expression, as Adorno would say, of "the forms of competitive
society . • . in which the critic measures himself exclusively by his success in
the market and he is, for that reason, a product of the market" (1962:11).
The truth of ideology, on the other hand, must be an unrealized truth; it
refers to the unrealized utopian components which ideology regards as already
realized in the reality to which it both refers and at the same time justifies.
Ideology is then ideology only if it is simultaneously false and true. The fact
that this statement must appear paradoxically contradictory to an ideological
consciousness is precisely a manifestation of a thought which is constrained by
a logic which examines immediacy as necessarily non-contradictory. I will not
elaborate this point here. When we say that ideology is false only by its
relationship to existing reality although it can be true in itself, or when we
say that ideology is ideology only to the extent that it contains something which
independently emerges from the social process, as something with its own proper
claims, we simply mean that ideology presents the unrealized "true" ideas of
freedom, humanity, justice, and equality as though they were already realized.
Thus, ideology is the false thought which presents the historically earned truth
contained within itself as if it were already realized truth.
* * *
This is the concept of ideology which the young Marx formulated out of his
criticism of Hegel. I will return to this in Part II. But first we must see
how its germs are already found in Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit in relation
with the dialectic of Mastery and Slavery which alone, according to Hegel, can
comprehend History. For this, I follow Kojeve's presentation of Hegel (See
Kojeve, 1969:31-70).
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For Hegel, to understand the collapse of feudal society and the emergence of
bourgeois capitalism is to understand the realization of the ideal of the French
Revolution and this in turn entails understanding the ideas of the Aufklarung,
the Enlight~nment. But for Hegel, this was possible only by virtue of the
conquest of Europe by Napoleon whereby the idea of man was realized and history
came to an end or history was completed. The real process of historical
evolution created by man and transforming him came to an end. It was then
possible to become self-conscious of this process; this self-consciousness was the
absolute knowledge to be revealed by Hegel in the Phenomenology.
Hegel begins by saying that human existence cannot be conceived without con-
sciousness of the external world, that is, there must be revelation of "objective,"
"external" being by speech. But this consciousness, which Hegel calls "sense
certainty" is "contemplative," "passive;" it leaves being independent of the
knowledge that apprehends it. Consciousness is absorbed in the contemplation of
the thing and does not yet represent self-consciousness and consequently no
opposition between the apprehending subject and the apprehended object. In fact,
man is yet not conscious of his existence; he cannot posit the "I am." For this
to be possible, something other than purely passive contemplation must be present;
this other is desire. Only then can man become aware of himself, for example,
when he is hungry, thirsty, cold, et cetera. By desire man is brought back to
himself and this entails the realization that there is he and an opposed external
reality which is non-he. But desire cannot be desire without its entailing the
transformation of that which is non-I, the negation of its independence by action,
that is, action that negates or transforms the given. "The human I must be an I
of Desire--that is, an active I, a negating I, an I that transforms Being and
creates a new being by destroying the given being. Man is what he is only
to the extent that he becomes what he is; his true Being is Becoming, Time,
History; and he becomes, he is History only and by Action that negates the given,
the Action of Fighting and of Work••. " (Kojeve, 1946:38).
Desire as yet is not sufficient for self-consciousness to exist, for the
animal also negates nature but does not transcend itself as given; the animal
simply remains in the immediacy of the satisfaction of its desire. To be
human, then, entails more than just the satisfaction of animal desire; it entails
not action to subjugate a thing, but action to subjugate another desire. Thus
human desire is desire of an other desire; it is the desire for recognition and
the action which ensues from i- that reveals a distinctively human, nonbiological
I. In other words, man cannot be conceived of without the existence of "several
Desires that can desire one another mutually, each of which wants to negate, to
assimilate, to make its own, to subjugate, the other Desire as Desire" (Kojeve,
1946:40). Man, then, cannot be fully satisfied except by a universal recognition
(by universal recognition (by universal self-consciousness).4 In the beginning,
though, the action that derives from this multiplicity of desires for universal
recognition can be nothing other than a fight for life and death, a fight for
recognition, for pure prestige. This is because desire of other desire is a
negating action which goes beyond the biological given; and this is what is
truly human. Human, historical existence is only possible where there have been
bloody struggles and wars for recognition.
Since human reality cannot be conceived without the struggle for mutual
recognition of one man by another~ the fight for life and death cannot result in
the death of one of the adversaries, for if such were to occur the victor would
be left alone to be recognized by no one. The fight must therefore end in such a
way that both adversaries remain alive. But this implies that the vanquished
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submit to the victor whom he recognizes but who does not recognize him in turn.
The victor becomes the Master of the vanquished while the latter becomes the
Slave of the victor. And this amounts to the vanquished having to relinquish his
desire for recognition and accepting the desire for biological survival.
For Hegel, then, four irreducible premises are required to understand the
possibility of history, which is the history of fight and work: 1) the existence
of revelation of given being through speech (sense certainty); 2) the existence
of a desire which engenders action that destroys, negates, and transforms given
being; 3) the existence of a multiplicity of desires striving for mutual recogni-
tion; and 4) the existence of the possibility of a future difference between
Master and Slave. It is important to stress that the last premise underlies
freedom. This is because nothing is assumed which predisposes the Master to mastery
and the Slave to slavery; only the free act that creates the difference is assumed.
By definition the free act is undeducib1e, hence, an absolute premise.
Now, the true and most vicious enemy of man is Nature, and it is the desire
of being liberated from Nature which marks the first act of man as human. This
liberation entails more than just animal desire, for as we have seen this is a
necessary but not sufficient condition. What makes man human is the existence
of non-biological desires of other's desires; he cannot be conceived otherwise.
To rise above Nature, then, means to rise above the mere satisfaction of biological
instincts. Liberation from Nature requires, therefore, its transformation, its
negation. Work is the unique activity of man which accomplishes this. Work is
"an essentially human and humanizing action" (Kojeve, 1946:42). But true
liberation from Nature, although accomplished through work cannot be realized
within work. The Master's true liberation from Nature, his superiority over
Nature, is realized by interposing work between him and Nature through the Slave
who transforms it in conformity to the Master's demands. The work process is
a creation of a second nature, a humanized world created by man in the course of
his negating interaction with Nature. It is easy to understand now why for Hegel,
universal history, which includes the interaction between men in relation to
Nature, is the history which can be comprehended only through the dialectic of
the opposition between belicose masters and working slaves. It is also easy to
see why Hegel conceived the end of history at the. moment of the dialectical
overcoming of both Master and Slave, that is, when mankind is no longer split
between masters and slaves. It is then that the possibility of full mutual
understanding of "absolute knowledge," of "universal recognition" can be
realized. What is less clear is that Hegel seemed to have concluded that he
was able to have this "absolute knowledge" because history had in fact ended,
that the synthesis of Mastery and Slavery had been realized in the Citizen of
the universal and homogeneous state created by Napoleon. In order not to be
detracted from Hegel's pathbreaking contribution, we must disregard this aspect
(already criticized by Marx) for the time being.
We have seen that the Master's superiority over nature, his liberation from
nature, has granted him Freedom. But this freedom, according to Hegel, involves
a contradiction. On the one hand, the Master risked his life in a fight for
recognition and this created the Slave who recognized him but was not recognized
in turn. His act was not reciprocated. Reciprocal recognition entails
recognition by someone else who is like oneself. 5 But the Slave's recognition
of the Master is only the recognition of a Slave, a Thing, an extension of the
Master between him and Nature through the Slave's work; to be recognized by a
Thing is like not being recognized at all. This involves the central assumption
that the Master is not satisfied with his "real" freedom because it precludes
recognition by another human being. The Master is only recognized by a Slave
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who is not a human being but a thing. On the side of the Slave this entails that
he is not recognized. We have then an· "existential impasse." Master can either
make himself brutish in pleasure or die on the field of battle as Master, but
he cannot live consciously with the knowledge that he is satisfied by what he is"
(Kojeve's italics; Kojeve, 1946:46-47). But this impasse cannot be resolved
by the Master, as we will see below. Yet the human ideal contained in this
impasse, born with the Master, "can be realized and revealed .•• only in and by
Slavery" (Kojeve, 1946:47). The ideal of freedom, after all, could only exist
if Slavery exists.
The Slave, who has opted for a slavish existence because he feared death,
works in the service of the Master. Since there is no other instinct forcing
the Slave to work for the Master, just as there is nothing which predisposes the
Slave to slavery, his survival depends on the fact that he works. By work,
he negates, transforms the given Nature, and this entails the possession of a
science, a technique, and the faculty of abstract notions. "Understanding, abstract
thought, science, technique, the arts--all of these, then, have their origin in the
forced work of the Slave" (Kojeve, 1946:49). If the working Slave was the condition
which realized the Master's freedom, now the Slave, by his work, succeeds in
subduing the same Nature that dominated both him and the Master at the moment of
the fight. Thus through his work, the Slave "by using the thought that arises
from his Work, he forms the abstract notion of the Freedom that has been realized
in him by this same Work" (Kojeve) 1946:49). Of course, the notion of Freedom
is abstract, not real, for the Slave remains in fact a Slave, albeit with an
idea of Freedom and the consciousness of being a Slave, that is, unfree.
The Master, on the other hand, is free; he has no abstract idea of Freedom.
Either freedom is real, or the idea of freedom is to be realized in the conditions
of slavery. The Master strengthens the reality of Freedom by forcing the Slave
to work more, that is, by further restricting the Slave's freedom. But this also
strengthens the Slave's abstract idea of Freedom. The Master's freedom is at an
impasse. In addition, it is particularistic and cannot be universally recognized
as the idea of human Freedom. The latter can only be realized by the active
abolition of Slavery and consequently the abolition of the Master's freedom; it
is a qualitatively different freedom. Since the Master's freedom is realized
only through and by the fight; it does not entail the transformation of the world
of Nature. Man could not have changed) or engendered historical change, without
the Slave's work. The liberation from Nature entailed in the Master's freedom
is only a rising above Nature which leaves Nature untouched; it is an abstract
negation of Nature in its totality. Only the Slave's work achieves a concrete
negation of Nature and engenders the historical becoming of man. Work is the
true liberating activity of man from his most acerbic enemy--Nature. It is this
activity which has not only produced man's humanized Nature but through it man
has changed himself. "Therefore, the historical process, the historical
becoming of the human being, is the product of the working Slave and not of the
warlike Master" (Kojeve, 1946:52). For this reason also, the perpetuation of
Master's freedom is the perpetuation of universal slavery of man by man and of
man by Nature. The recognition of work as the essential liberating activity of
man, hence humanizing, the conception that man is the point of departure and the
poing of arrival of all things, and the abstract idea of universal Freedom--al1
these are the legacy of the Enlightenment.
With this we come now closer to what interests us most. The Slave, through
his work, elevated himself ·to the abstract idea of Freedom, and I will add the
ideas of equality, justice, and humanity; but he can only realize these ideas by
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the practical abolition of Slavery. But before realizing Freedom which entails
facing the Master in a fight and risking his life, the Slave, in his failure to
overcome mastery or in his inability to rise against the Master, invents a
series of justifications to "reconcile the ideal of Freedom with the fact of
slavery" (Kojeve, 1946:53). These justifications we can call, for the moment,
Slave "ideologies~" although they do not yet correspond to the concept of
ideology which I have briefly introduced above. For Hegel, the first of these
ideologies is Stoicism. The Slave, with his abstract i4ea of freedom, convinces
himself in thought that he is free and disregards the real conditions of
existence which actually maintain him as a Slave. Freedom is still identical
with freedom of thought. The similarity of a modern version of this Stoicism
in the state was already pointed out by Hegel. The stoic's freedom precludes
action and as long as there is "freedom of speech" things need not be changed.
Inaction and changed conditions which still maintain slavery result in the next
Slave ideo!ogy--skeptic-nihilism. Freedom of expression and the self-persuasion
that there is freedom of thought regardless of the actual conditions of slavery
turns into the abstract negation of the given conditions. Skeptic-nihilism in
its extreme form culminates in solipsism: all that is not-I is abstractly
denied. The contradiction of existence which Slave ideologies try to reconcile
is not resolved in practice and is finally justified in thought by the most
"rational," and therefore last, of Slave ideologies. For Hegel, this last Slave
ideology is the Christian ideology. It is the central characteristic of
Christianity that it does not try to deny the contradictory character of existence;
on the contrary, it accepts it as necessary and inevitable. Freedom, equality,
and justice are no longer either abstract and unrealizable ideas, nor an abstract
negation of the given. Freedom is real in the "other world." The contradiction
between the ideal freedom of the soul in the beyond and its servitude on earth
is reflected in what Hegel called "unhappy consciousness." The synthesis of
mastery and slavery can only be realized in the Beyond. In this world everything
is slavery, and since Freedom and equality can only be realized in the "next
life," there is no need to confront the Master. Action is therefore reduced to
purely ethical and individualistic conduct that would merit one's attainment of
the transcendental world without changing the conditions in this world. We must
"give Caesar what is Caesar's and God what is God's." But in Christianity, Hegel
says, the acceptance of worldly mastery is only at the expense of positing an
absolute Master--God. Both the worldly Master and the Slave are made the slaves
of a transcendental Master to whom everybody is a slave. The abstract quality
between worldly Master and worldly Slave is achieved by accepting an absolute
slavery. The solution is both ingenious and paradoxical. Now the Slave "although
no longer has a Master, he does not cease to be a Slave." "He is a Slave without
a Master, he is a Slave in himself, he is the pure essence of Slavery" (Kojeve,
1946:56). In the final analysis we have, with Hegel, that the worldly Master
was engendered when the vanquished, in the fight, accepted slavery as the price
to be paid to preserve his biological life. The absolute transcendental Master
was ironically engendered by a similar defeat: the necessity of accepting both
the worldly Master (or Slave) and the condition of man's "necessary" existence--
death, finiteness. Thus, the resolution of the internal contradiction of the
Christian ideology requires now the liberation of man from the absolute Master
while accepting the idea of death. The realization of Freedom in this world is
possible then under the condition that man accept atheism. 6 For Hegel, a
definite step in this direction was effected in the French Revolution, which was
still not a revolution in the sense that the Slave overthrew the conditions of
slavery and was to be completed only by the universal "Absolute" State. The
problem then becomes one of understanding the realization of the Christian
ideology in the real world when there has been no fight between Masters and Slaves.
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This is an important point for the understanding of a critical concept of ideology
in the capitalist world.
The realization of the Christian Slave ideology in the real world can be
understood as the emergence of the last and present form of ideology, that is,
as we have mentioned before, the belief that the ideas of freedom, equality,
justice, and humanity are already realized in the present conditions of bourgeois
existence. Although a more detailed analysis of this would require showing how
the pagan world of mastery becomes a Christian world of universal slavery, I will
forego this analysis which is presented by Hegel in Section A of Chapter VI of
the Phenomenology and summarized in Kojeve, 1946:57-63.
The Slave's Christian ideology was characterized, as all Slave ideologies,
by the reconciliation of the fact of slavery with the idea of Freedom. But
this reconciliation differed substantially from that of former Slave ideologies,
as for example, stoicism and skepticism, in that it transformed both worldly
mastery as well as slavery into a universal slavery of a transcendental Master--
God. The crucial transition which interests us is the moment when the worldly
masters accept their Slaves' ideology. It is at this point that "the pagan Man
of Mastery has become the Christian Man of slavery; and all this without a
Fight, without a Revolution properly so-called--because the Masters themselves
have become Slaves • This Slave without a Master, this Master without a
Slave, is what Hegel calls the Bourgeois, the private property owner" (Kojeve,
1946:63).
The emergence of the bourgeois is characterized by the fact that he must
work like a Slave but unlike the latter he has no worldly Master. The
bourgeois believes that he works for himself. Whereas the Slave worked, supported
by the idea of the Master, the bourgeois works only for himself but he
acknowledges no worldly master and he does not work supported by even the idea
of the illusory community of the state which he does not yet have. The early
capitalism of the working bourgeois was nothing but "an agglomeration of private
property-owners, isolated from each other, without true community" (Kojeve,
1946:65). The bourgeois therefore must elevate property, production, money,
profit capital to an absolute value and to a transcendental entity which "becomes
independent of him and enslaves him just as the Master enslaved the Slave"
(Kojeve,1946:65). The Master of the working bourgeois is no longer a
transcendental God but capital to whom he devotes his actions and sacrifices
his sensual and biological desires. The existence of a transcendental ideal
world represented in reality by money, capital presupposes an abnegation, an
abstinence through which the working bourgeois transcends himself.7 But abnegation
still reflects the dualism of the Christian ideology between a transcendent world,
represented in reality by money, capital, and the actual, sensual, sacrificing
and enslaved individual. Furthermore, the ideal of individuality, the synthesis
of the particular and the universal which Christian ideology resolved in the
"after-life," must now be resolved during man's life here on earth. For Hegel,
the complete realization of the Christian ideal on earth is achieved by the
bourgeois state: "The transcendent Universal (God), who recognizes the
Particular, must be replaced by a Universal that is immanent in the World"
(Kojeve, 1946:67). And this is what at the closing of the bourgeois revolution
was to be achieved by Napoleon's empire: the realization of the Christian
kingdom of heavon on earth.
The realization of the Christian ideal on earth requires the elimination of
the idea of transcendence; it requires the unity of thought and action, of
theory and praxis. This unique historical event happened precisely in the
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bourgeois revolution. On the one hand, the working bourgeois prepared the social
and political conditions, and on the other, the thought of the Enlightenment
provided the theory which was successfully used by the revolutionary bourgeois.
This theory destroyed the Christian theology while preserving the utopian
elements which were to be realized. The thought of the Enlightenment was joined
to the real process of the fight by the working bourgeois. In the bourgeois
revolution, though, the synthesis of mastery and slavery took a peculiar form.
It was not the result of a fight between Masters and Slaves, for in the
bourgeois world there were no Masters. "The Fight in question, therefore, cannot
be a class fight properly so-called, a war between the Masters and the Slaves.
The bourgeois is neither Slave nor Master; he is--being the Slave of Capital--
his own Slave. It is from himself, therefore, that he must free himself" (Kojeve,
1946:69).
This is, in essence, Hegel's interpretation of history which provides the
basis for an understanding of a critical concept of ideology. But before
proceeding, some possible misinterpretations must be cleared up. It may appear
that Hegel's exposition of the dialectic of fight and work and the struggle for
recognition is an inversion of the real dialectic. Marx has often been quoted
to support this warning. For example, in Capital, Marx points out that Hegel's
mystification of the dialectic "must be turned right side up again if you want to
discover the rational Kernel with the mystical shell" (Marx, 1967:20). But more
frequently than Marx, it has been Engels who has been quoted for this purpose.
In Anti-During, Engels indicates that for Hegel "things and their evolution were
only the realized copies of the 'Idea' existing somewhere from eternity before
the world was" (1962:38). And elsewhere Engels says: "The Hegelian system
represents merely a materialism idealistically turned upside down"(1941:24).
The insistence by mechanistic Marxism on such an "inversion" has resulted quite
often in a position which regards consciousness as automatically determined by
material processes and therefore has tried in vain to derive it mechanically from
such processes, a procedure not different from that of the ideologues. The
presentation that I have given, which follows Kojeve's quite closely, has attempted
to avoid such a mechanistic sheath while avoiding the extreme idealist mystification.
That human desire is desire of an other desire, that it is the desire for
recognition, cannot be denied without denying man as human, that is, different from
the animal. In fact, man cannot be conceived otherwise. To attempt a derivation
of consciousness from the dialectic of material processes is self-contradictory
for it demands precisely what it opposes--the explanation of consciousness by
consciousness.
Hence, we must be cautious about interpreting the dialectic of pure con-
sciousness as the prejudiced account which sides with the Master's view. It is
not nobility, honor in battle, heroic valor and bravery which account for the
fact of slavery, although such concepts have in fact been used by the Masters
themselves to justify domination. The servitude of the vanquished (the Slave)
does not continuously result from the victor's superior valor but from the
latter's advantageous position, as an already constituted Master to subdue the
Slave and to enslave. To say that slavery emerges because the development of the
forces of production made the employment of Slave profitable would beg the question
of what and for whom it is profitable. Similarly, if recognition is made to
result from the experience of real struggles, then, the dialectic of consciousness
and existence is obliterated. That wealth, the monopolization of power and bellic
technology, as well as the time for dedication to the arts of combat are ultimately
bound to the Slave's recognition of the superiority of the Master is perfectly
consistent with the dialectic of mastery and servitude. But this does neither imply
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a justification of slavery nor of war for its own sake or in the name of a pure
fight for recognition. Established slavery obviously means that Slaves are
produced and reproduced under that system without being continuously the result
of defeat in the field of battle. It is not the heroism of the Master or the
spirit of submission of the Slave that reproduces the slave system. It is the
alienation within this system which simultaneously allows its maintenance and
raises consciousness beyond the system itself. Far from condoning slavery as
a system of oppression, Hegel has shown how the "universal self-consciousness"
of man, his total satisfaction, can only be achieved by the synthesis of
mastery and slavery, that is, the end of slavery and oppression. Only the dia-
lectic of fight and work could make this clear; but only a dialectic which allows
consciousness not to be mechanically determined by sheer material processes, a
dialectic which instead exalts man's consciousness above and beyond the real
conditions with which it interacts, can grasp both the "unhappy consciousness"
and its self~transcendence in reality. Rather than concealing the real struggles
of the Slaves in history, or intellectually condemning the system of slavery,
Hegel has provided a powerful interpretation of history whereby the illusions of
man's consciousness are deciphered in connection with the real historical
circumstances which accompanied them and which simultaneously brought their
overcoming. It was left to Marx to cont.Lnue the same task for the historical
period of established capitalism.
Hegel comprehended both the dependent and independent components of the
Slave ideology in its historical movement. But Hegel's account of the abolition
of the historically developed Slave's ideology by its realization in the
bourgeois revolution resulted not in the abolition of ideology in general but
in the establishing of ideology in its new form and its new content. To the
extent that Hegel regarded the historically won truth as already realized in
the bourgeois order, in the absolute state, he was advocating the ideology of
the new order. It was the acceptance of the critical thought of the Enlighten-
ment as already realized. In spite of this, Hegel must be credited for having
shown that the new ideology can only be understood as the dialectical overcoming
of the last Slave ideology--Christianity--in the bourgeois revolution, which was
not a revolution properly so-called. The bourgeois revolution, and this point
must be stressed, did in fact abolish the Slave ideology by realizing it but
it did not abolish slavery. Slave ideology, if we recall, resulted from the
failure to realize the abstract idea of freedom; these ideologies were therefore
characterized by theoretical attempts to reconcile the ideal of Freedom with
the fact of slavery. The Master, with no ideal to realize, for freedom is not
an ideal to him but a reality, cannot succeed in going beyond this freedom.
His thought could be said to be oriented toward the maintenance of the condition
of mastery and the subjugation of the Slave by force and domination. The first
step toward the abolition of Slave ideology was taken when the Masters accepted
the ideology of their Slaves. It is only at this point that we can talk about a
Master's ideology; the reason is because the Masters themselves have become
Slaves. This is what happened with Christianity as the last of the Slave's
ideologies. It was the abolition of this ideology, the Slaves' ideology taken
up by their masters, which the working bourgeois, which was neither a Slave nor
a Master, accomplished and in doing so established the ideology of the capitalist
era. The theoretical abolition of the Master's ideology carried out by the
Enlightenment joined the actual bourgeois movement and was realized in practice.
The new order contained now the abolished Master's ideology in a new form and
with a new content--freedom, equality, and justice were perceived as realized,
not in thought, but in the actual political and economic bourgeois order. The
accuaI workings of the bourgeois order, based on the principle of exchange, came
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in fact to sustain this conviction. Thus, a critical concept of ideology must
allow the criticism of the actual working of this order, and this is what Marx
proposed.
Footnotes
*Part II to be published in a subsequent issue of the KANSAS JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY
will deal with the development of the concept of ideology and the critique of
science.
IMaynard Solomon has advanced the idea that the Enlightenment was in part the
false consciousness of a dying class (the feudal nobility). It was the dream
world of a feudal society in dissolution. The Enlightenment simultaneously
served as a critique of feudal society and as a vehicle for the bourgeois
repudiation of that society. It co-opted and neutralized the radical intellect-
ualism but it was one of the means by which absolutism was ultimately destroyed.
"The Utopia of the nobility was an affirmation of rationality and beauty•..
But the rational was not real: The history of the declining years of feudalism
was marked by the eruption of the 'irrational' forces of revolution, war,
decadence and decline. Therefore the affirmation of rationality involved a
self-deception which required a reality-transcending affirmation." Thus the
enlightenment as feudal self-justification was self-destructive. (Solomon,
1971:32-47, esp. 32-33 and 40).
2Consciousness is not dependent on merely individual physiological processes, or
is an independent and ahistorical datum; on the contrary, consciousness is rooted
on the underlying objective processes of society. The forms and content of
consciousness change with the change of man's praxis. This conception was clearly
established by Marx in the Holy Family and The German Ideology. Ideology is not
rooted on individual consciousness but it encompasses all the false consciousness
embodied in man's political, juridical, artistic, and religious forms of thought.
It is for this reason that "neither legal relations nor political forms could be
comprehended whether by themselves or on the basis of a so-called general develop-
ment of the human mind, but that on the contrary they originate in the material
conditions of life" (Marx, 1970:20).
3Solomon's contention that the main line of Enlightenment thought 'was developed
by men of aristocratic origin or was encouraged under the aegis of aristocratic
patronage" (he mentions for example the cases of Holbach, Montesquieu, Turgot,
Grim, Dalembert, who were aristocrats by birth, but also those who were not but
who were patronized by the nobility such as Rousseau, Diderot, Herder, Voltaire,
etc.) does not prove that the Enlightenment was an ideology. In fact this more than
confuses matters, for labeling these ideas as ideology may lead to a dangerous
interpretation which would eliminate the possibility of something better (See:
Solomon, 1971:33-34).
4 I t must be mentioned that expressions such as "desire as desire," do not appear
in Hegel. He uses instead expressions such as "self-consciousness finds its
satisfaction only in another self-consciousness."
5I t has been pointed out by Kojeve somewhere else that the relation domination
to servitude does not take in account the recognition of masters among themselves.
See: Alexandre Kojeve, "Hegel, Marx et Ie Christianisme," Critique (August-Sept.),
1946:353.
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6Nietzche's "principle of ressentiment" and "bad conscience" follows the same
dialectic of Hegel. Ressentiment develops among the Slave. Having produced the
idea of Freedom, the Slave resents the evaluation of mastery as good, aristo -
cratic, beautiful, happy, and effects a transvaluation by which his wretched,
poor, weak, lowly, suffering condition becomes the good, pious, the blessed, the
saved. This transvaluation is only an imaginary revenge, a reaction, a revolt in
morals. The idea of Freedom is only expressed as a critical ressentiment. The
reconciliation of the idea of Freedom with the fact of slavery becomes diverted
ressentiment: if I suffer it must be somebody's fault; the fault is in myself
against myself. The concepts of guilt, sin, corruption, develop simultaneously
with the displacement of Freedom to the other world. This is the "bad conscience"
that accompanies the diverted ressentiment of the Slave and is eventually adopted
by the Master. The contradiction of existence reflected in the Slave's "bad
conscience: is elevated to the level of universality. Its resolution, freeing
mankind from "bad conscience," is only possible with atheism.
7Weber's Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism grasped this moment of the
bourgeois revolution. "With great regularity," Weber says, "we find the most
genuine adherents of Puritanism among the classes which were rising from a lowly
status, the small bourgeois and farmers." The "calling," the "asceticism" of
hard work for the sake of capital found among the emerging bourgeoisie were the
worldly substitutes of the transcendental God. "The pursuit of wealth, stripped
of its religious and ethical meaning, tends to become associated with purely
mundane passions" (See Weber, 1958:174, 181-182).
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